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Bijuralism: A Supreme Court of Canada Justice's
Perspective
The Honourable Claire L 'Heureux-Dubg*
I consider it an honour to have been invited to deliver the Rubin
Lecture at the Louisiana State University Law Center. I had the
privilege and good fortune to know Judge Alvin Rubin. I am
delighted to have an opportunity to pay tribute to this great jurist
whose "intellect, scholarship and judicial leadership," in the words of
one of his colleagues, "place him in a select group" including
Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Learned Hand, and Henry Friendly, all
judicial icons.' Alvin Rubin was a giant among jurists and, most
importantly, one with a pronounced social conscience. The family
tradition of excellence is shared by his wife Janice, his sons Michael
and David, and his grandchildren.
Life sometimes gives you presents. For me, my initial encounter
with Janice and Alvin was a precious gift. It was purely fortuitous
that Alvin and I were members of the faculty together-way back in
the 1970s-at judicial education summer seminars for superior court
judges in Canada. I became an admirer of the Rubins, and we have
deepened this friendship to this day. This lecture on bijuralism thus
has great personal significance for me.
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor William Tetley of Montr6al's McGill University, who
recently published a brilliant paper in the Louisiana Law Review on
mixed jurisdictions, wrote that "outside of Europe and such places as
Qu6bec, Louisiana and South Africa, there is little discussion of
mixed jurisdictions; in fact the subject is usually met with
indifference."2 I am glad, in light of his remarks, to be in front of this
receptive audience, but I am also confident that the subject of my
lecture today will not be relegated to the shadows of international
legal affairs for long. Although it is not a household word outside
jurisdictions with dual legal systems, bijuralism is likely to be a
prominent subject of discussion on the international scene in the years
to come. This is because bijural states provide valuable examples of
Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. I would like to thank my law
clerk, Christopher Rickerd, for his assistance in the research and preparation of this
paper.
1. See Fred J. Cassibry, Personal Glimpses of an Honest Judge, 52 La. L.
Rev. 1397, 1403 (1992).
2. William Tetley, MixedJurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified
and Uncodified), 60 La. L. Rev. 677, 680 (2000).
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the manner in which legal systems can co-exist harmoniously. They
exemplify the very same elements of convergence and cross-
pollination that we see taking place in the global arena when
transnational legal encounters occur, especially those in commercial
law, with NAFTA3 and the EU as prime examples.
Indeed, because mixed jurisdictions of common law and civil law
include Louisiana, Quebec, St. Lucia, Puerto Rico, South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, the Philippines,
Sri Lanka, and Scotland, there are strongholds of bijuralism
throughout the world ready to teach theoretical and practical lessons
to their monoglot counterparts. Nevertheless, I do recognize that with
civil-law jurisdictions representing forty-six percent of the world's
jurisdictions and common-law jurisdictions representing twenty-six
percent, the six percent with mixed systems are a distinct minority.4
It is not majority rule that leads to legal ideas triumphing, however,
but their relevance to contemporary problems and, in this field
especially, to the vastly increasing number of cross-cultural
interactions that implicate private law. In this sense, I propose to
offer the following observations on Canadian bijuralism in the spirit
lying behind the words of New York University Law School Dean
John Sexton, who stated last year that "perhaps the most profound
impact of globalization on the enterprise of legal education can be
captured in the word 'humility.' Discovering a premise that
unconsciously shaped one's thinking is a dramatic moment
intellectually, and the repetition of such discoveries should instill
intellectual humility and a reluctance to assume that there is a single
right answer."5
II. LEGAL EDUCATION
In this most appropriate setting, I would like to begin by
considering the foundation of any bijural system-legal education.
Several Canadian universities offer law degrees based on bijuralism,
namely the "national program" that allows students to pursue a
program of studies in both legal systems at the University of Ottawa;
the integrated studies program in common law and civil law at
3. For a description of one example of transnational convergence, see Jay L.
Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute NAFTA Insolvency
Project, 23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 7, 21 (1997).
4. Dean Louis Perret, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law (Civil side),
Challenges Facing Legal Education in the Americas Over the Next Century,
Speech Before the Association of American Law Schools Conference in New
Orleans, Louisiana (Jan. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
5. John Sexton, Thinking About the Training of Lawyers in the Next
Millennium, NYU Law School Magazine, Autumn 2000, at 34, 41.
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McGill University in Montr6al; and programs that promote the
teaching of the common law in French at the Universities of Ottawa
and Moncton. Other universities have established inter-faculty
exchange programs that occur during school terms, and the federal
Department of Justice sponsors a Student Mobility Program that
!ermits students to complete one term of study at a law school
teaching the other legal system. Students who take advantage of
these opportunities to learn about both legal systems of Canada have
a magnificent comparative legal education to offer their country and
the wider world. In this respect, your fine institution is a shining
example of the potential for innovative education based on two legal
systems.
III. BILINGUALISM
Canada not only faces the challenge of educating lawyers in the
intricacies of two legal systems but also must consider the role of two
languages. In Canada, there are 22.5 million anglophones
representing seventy-five percent of the population and 7.5 million
francophones accounting for the remaining quarter. Canada still has
to make progress before becoming a truly bilingual country in the
legal field as in all others. Within the province of Qu6bec, it is
remarkable, as one commentator has noted, that "[e]ven the accepted
interpretations of statutes, codal articles and cases have frequently
been dual. Secondary-source materials . . . have tended to be
deployed by those who practice law primarily in the language in
which these doctrinal sources were composed."6
This linguistic divide is especially relevant because, according to
Professor Tetley, "the long-term survival of a mixed jurisdiction is
greatly facilitated by (and perhaps even contingent upon) the presence
of at least two official (or at least widely-spoken) languages in that
jurisdiction, each mirroring and supporting the legal systems there."7
The first Canadian Official Languages Act was passed in 1969,
requiring federal government institutions to provide government
services in the official language of choice. In 1982, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms entrenched the constitutional
language rights of Canadians. The Supreme Court of Canada has
played an important role in ensuring that the legal system operates in
a comfortably bilingual manner. As an institution, it has made
considerable progress in becoming bilingual; for example, of my
6. Roderick A. Macdonald, Legal Bilingualism, 42 McGill L.J. 119, 154-55
(1997). Professor Macdonald is a law professor at McGill University and past
president of the Law Commission of Canada, an independent federal law reform
agency that advises Parliament on how to improve and modernize Canada's laws.
7. Tetley, supra note 2, at 681.
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eight colleagues, now only one speaks just English. With the
appointment of my colleague Louise Arbour in 1999, the Court for
the first time had a francophone majority. But the Court's real impact
on national bilingualism comes, of course, from its jurisprudence.
One of the Court's early decisions in the post-Charter era
exemplifies this commitment to bilingual legal practice in Canada.
Two years before I was appointed, in its 1985 decision in Re
Manitoba Language Rights,' the Court considered the legality of
unilingualism in the written law of Manitoba. Since 1890, the
Manitoba Legislature had enacted almost exclusively unilingual
(English) statutes and regulations despite the existence of an 1870
federal statute, the Manitoba Act, which requires the province to
publish in both French and English. This mandate to use two
languages has important jurisprudential implications because under
the "equal authenticity rule," Canadian courts have consistently
affirmed that the English and French versions of a statute are equally
authoritative. Interpretation thus necessitates reading the two texts in
light of one another.9
In Re Manitoba Language Rights, the Court ruled that all the
unilingual laws were invalid but suspended this declaration
temporarily to avoid an anarchic legal vacuum. In so doing, the
decision emphasized the constitutive role of language and its
inextricable ties to the law:
The importance of language rights is grounded in the essential
role that language plays in human existence, development and
dignity. It is through language that we are able to form
concepts; to structure and order the world around us.
Language bridges the gap between isolation and community,
allowing humans to delineate the rights and duties they hold
in respect of one another, and thus to live in society.'0
Despite this type of pronouncement, however, there is still much
work to do. Canada's Commissioner of Official Languages, Dr.
Dyane Adam, has made it one of her top priorities to follow up on the
recommendations of a 1995 study entitled "The Equitable Use of
English and French Before the Courts in Canada."" She has recently
mentioned the beneficial impact of our Court's decision in R. v.
8. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (Can.).
9. See generally Michael Beaupr6, Litigating the Meaning of Bilingual
Legislation, 9 Advoc. Q. 327 (1988).
10. Re Manitoba Language Rights, I S.C.R. at 744.
11. Dyane Adam, Giving French and English Their Due Place in the
Administration of Justice, Speech Before the Association des Civilistes (Nov. 30,
2000) (on file with author).
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Beaulac in 1999,12 which cited the study. In Beaulac, the accused
was charged with first-degree murder in British Columbia. In his
third trial, which followed a mistrial and a conviction overturned by
the Court of Appeal, the accused renewed his prior requests for a trial
before a judge and jury who speak both official languages, as
provided for by the federal Criminal Code. A judge dismissed this
application, based on the accused's passable English, and the trial
proceeded in English to convict him. Our Court ordered a new trial
to be held before a bilingual judge and jury.
Our judgment observed that:
Language rights are not negative rights, or passive rights; they
can only be enjoyed if the means are provided. This is
consistent with the notion favoured in the area of international
law that the freedom to choose is meaningless in the absence
of a duty of the State to take positive steps to implement
language guarantees. 3
We held that "[t]his Court has recognized that substantive equality is
the correct norm to apply in Canadian law. Where institutional
bilingualism in the courts is provided for, it refers to equal access to
services of equal quality for members of both official language
communities in Canada." 4 It was not until his fourth trial that Jean
Victor Beaulac was given a bilingual judge and jury, but his case has
set an appropriately permissive standard for future defendants to
employ.
In concluding this section on bilingualism and Canadian law, I
would like to deploy Roderick Macdonald's distinction between legal
dualism and legal bilingualism, namely that the former is the two
solitudes model while the latter is the cooperative model to which we
should aspire. Professor Macdonald cautioned that:
Numerous factors contribute to the apparently inexorable
decay of legal bilingualism into legal dualism: intellectual
laziness among legal professionals; rampant unilingualism
among legal elites; a proliferation of mediocre translations of
texts; an educational system that privileges information over
understanding; and, not least, a plethora of secondary sources
and computerized finding tools. 5
My colleague Justice Michel Bastarache also has noted the disturbing
perception that "decisions of Quebec courts that are rendered in
12. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 (Can.).
13. Id. at 788.
14. Id. at 789.
15. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 156.
20021
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French are not fully heeded in other jurisdictions, undoubtedly due to
the language barrier. ['M]uch of Qurbec Civil law and Quebec French
unilingual commentary and manyjudicial decisions, even on non-Civil
law matters, remain a closed book to those outside Qurbec.[']"'
16
Because effective Canadian bijuralism depends on a firm bilingual
underpinning, these concerns merit sustained attention and corrective
action. Macdonald concluded,
Legal bilingualism would ultimately require bilingualism in all
its practitioners. Rather than encouraging or even allowing two
distinct official legal cultures to form around two languages,
the practice of legal bilingualism would draw on both
languages to construct one official legal culture. In Canada
today, that official legal culture is neither French nor English,
neither civil law nor common law; it is all these together, with
the ambiguity that such complexity implies. 7
III. HISTORY
Having sketched the context of two vital components of
contemporary Canadian bijuralism, legal education, and legal
bilingualism, I would like now to go back in time in order to outline the
origins of our bijural nation." Following the defeat of French forces by
the British at the Plains of Abraham, located in Quebec City, and the
subsequent peace Treaty of Paris in 1763, "there was an initial period
of confusion as to the applicable law, during which the French
population generally boycotted the newly-established English courts
and settled private law disputes according to the old law (ancien
droit)." 9 The British Parliament soon passed the Quebec Act of 1774,
preserving the "laws of Canada" (civil law) for "Property and Civil
Rights" in Quebec, while requiring adherence to English criminal law.
The first codification took place almost a century later, with the
promulgation of the Civil Code of Lower Canada of 1866, drafted in
16. The Honourable Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache, Bijuralism in Canada,
Unpublished Address (Feb. 4, 2000) (quoting John E.C. Brierley, Biuralism in
Canada, in Canadian Reports to the 1990 International Congress of Comparative
Law 22, 39 (Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University,1990), reprinted in
Department of Justice Canada, Byuralism and Harmonization: Genesis, in Booklet
1 of The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province
of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism 20 (Second Publication, 2001), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/booklet1.htm).
17. Macdonald, supra note 6, at 165 (emphasis added).
18. I draw in this section on Professor Tetley's historical summary, supra note
2, at 693.
19. Id. at 694.
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French and English, with both versions official,2" and the Code of
Civil Procedure of 1867. These were in force when the province of
Qu6bec became part of the Dominion of Canada at our country's
Confederation on July 1, 1867. By virtue of section 92(13) of
Canada's Constitution Act, 1867, each provincial legislature was
guaranteed the power to legislate in private law matters relating to
property and civil rights.
Professor Tetley noted that:
Unlike the French Civil Code of 1804, with its revolutionary
ideals, and the Italian or German codes, aimed at
consolidating a newly-achieved national unity, the Civil Code
of Lower Canada reflected the conservative, family-oriented
values of the largely rural (and mostly francophone) society
of nineteenth-century Qu6bec, as well as the economic
liberalism of the burgeoning commercial and industrial (and
primarily anglophone) elites concentrated in Montreal. In
structure and style, the Code reflected the French Civil Code
of 1804 very closely. Nevertheless, it rejected major elements
of the French Code which were.., socially unacceptable to
most Qu6be[cois] (notably divorce), while maintaining
elements of the pre-revolutionary French law... It also added
certain local elements.2
The leading English language treatise on the civil law in Canada
states, the Code:
[S]uperimposed elements of English and commercial law, as
well as local variations on received Civil law, all woven
together into a synthetic whole. Substantively, it reflects a
blending of institutions and values of the ancien droit
(particularly in marriage, filiation, and inheritance) with the
rationalistic and liberal values of the enlightenment
(particularly in contract, civil liability, and property).2
It took a century before comprehensive reform of this
Confederation-era Code took place. McGill University Professor
Paul-Andr6 Cr6peau in 1966, at the height of Qu6bec's modernizing
"Quiet Revolution," became the head of the Civil Code Revision
Office ("CCRO"), created in 1955. By the time his work was
finished, in 1978, he could reflect on the fact that the 1866 Code had
20. The original Article 2615 (renumbered as Article 2714 in 1974) directed
the interpreter to the language version most in accord with the existing law on
which the article concerned was founded.
21. Tetley, supra note 2, at 695.
22. J.E.C. Brierley & R.A. Macdonald, Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction to
Quebec Private Law 35 (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1993).
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"ceased to be a symbol of permanence, and ha[d] instead become one
of rigidity, the reflection of a static, even stagnant, conception of a
certain social order."23 In 1980, a portion of the new Civil Code of
Quebec dealing with family law was enacted, based on the
recommendations of the CCRO's Report. I had served as President
of the Family Law and Family Court Committees from 1972 to 1976.
Quebec therefore had two civil codes in force at the same time.
From 1983 to 1991, eight measures were adopted, including sections
on the law of persons, successions and property. The whole of the
present Civil Code of Quebec was enacted in December 1991 and
came into force on January 1, 1994, replacing nearly eighty percent
of the Civil Code of Lower Canada 4 and incorporating modem
notions including human rights. It has been hailed as the "world's
most sophisticated and modernized Civil law regime of commercial
transactions."2 5
IV. FEDERAL HARMONIZATION
Throughout this period of development of the civil law in Qu6bec,
the federal government faced the challenge of enacting legislation
that respected the bijural nature of provincial law.26 Because there is
no federal code of private law, statutes enacted by the Canadian
Parliament depend on the laws of each province and territory for their
effective operation. The provincial laws have what is called a
suppletive role. This forces greater reflection on the part of the
federal legislator because:
[F]ederal law [must] be grounded in generic concepts that
clearly identify the finalities desired by the Parliament of
Canada in a language that respects equally all provincial and
territorial legal traditions. Federal statutes.., evolve towards
a goal-driven expression of their aims and regulatory
23. Paul Andr6 Cr6peau, "Foreword" to the Report on the Quebec Civil Code,
vol. 1, Draft Civil Code xxiii (tditeur officiel du Quebec, 1978).
24. Mario Dion, "Preface" to Department of Justice Canada, Bijuralism and
Harmonization: Genesis, in Booklet 1 of The Harmonization ofFederal Legislation
with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism at vii
(Second Publication, 2001).
25. Roderick A. Macdonald, Bijuralism in Canadian Law-Towards a Model
for the 21 st Century, Address at the Symposium "The Harmonization of Federal
Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism" (Nov. 24, 1997)
[hereinafter Macdonald, Bijuralism in Canadian Law] available at
http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/pc/speeches/s2 4 1197.html.
26. In 1977, in Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.,
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054 (Can.), the Supreme Court decided that there is no general
"federal judicially-created common law" which fills the gap if Parliament has not
legislated on a certain matter.
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ambition... Federal law [cannot] simply take an inventory of
different provincial concepts as defining its scope, but must
imagine its own policy strategies, and develop the functional
definition by which these may be implemented coherently
across Canada. 7
Thus, the enactment of the new Quebec Civil Code in 1994 forced
a review of the more than 700 federal statutes in existence, 300 of
which were found to be affected by changes in the Code. Of the
approximately 60 new laws adopted annually by Parliament, half are
estimated to be candidates for harmonization."8 The Minister of
Justice stated in June 2000 that she hopes that "the process of going
back and ensuring that existing legislation is in keeping with the
principles of the Civil Code [will be completed] over the next eight
years. ' 29 The Minister went on to emphasize that:
This has significant practical application for, for example,
those who practise law in Quebec or les notaires who are
responsible for dealing with house transactions and dealing
with what we call mortgages in English, and in terms of
bankruptcy and insolvency. This is, perhaps, not glamorous,
but it is the bread and butter of a lot of practising lawyers and
notaries. They will be able to serve their clients better and,
therefore, the residents of Quebec better when our federal
laws that apply in Quebec reflect the principles, the concepts
and the language of the civil law. I do not want people to
think that this is some erudite exercise that we are embarking
on only because all these good people need ajob. In fact, we
have lots of work to do in the Department of Justice. This is
actually about facilitating lawyers and notaries and the people
of Qu&bec in understanding their rights and obligations and
exercising them in areas where we, the federal government,
touch upon the private law of Qufbec. 0
To give one example of the way in which this massive effort to
achieve harmonization will operate, I note that the review exercise
identified conflicts between the Federal Income Tax Act and the Civil
27. Macdonald, Bijuralism in Canadian Law, supra note 25.
28. Mario Dion, Harmonization of Federal Law with Quebec Civil Law:
Canadian Bijuralism and Its Actualization (2000), reprinted in Department of
Justice Canada, Bijuralism and Harmonization: Genesis, in Booklet 1 of The
Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of
Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism 27 (Second Publication, 2001).
29. The Honourable Anne McLellan, Testimony to the Standing Senate
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (June 14, 2000) [hereinafter
McLellan Testimony] (on file with author).
30. Id.
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Code. The approach that the federal government will take will be to
first "determine if there is an equivalent concept in civil law in
Qu6bec. If not, [the Department of Justice] will attempt to develop
a consensus.., to see if [it] should create a new institution or... use
a neutral term that would not be offensive to civil or common law."
3'
The Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1,32 came
into force on June 1, 2001. Its provisions are of interest because the
bill's purposes are integral to the preservation of bijuralism in
Canada. The overriding purpose of the proposed Act was stated as
being to "ensure that all existing federal legislation that deals with
private law integrates the terminology, concepts and institutions of
Qu6bec civil law. 33  It also contains this important rule of
interpretation for courts to follow:
Unless otherwise provided by law, when an enactment
contains both civil law and common law terminology, or
terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and
the common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to
be adopted in the Province of Quebec and the common law
terminolo y or meaning is to be adopted in the other
provinces.
The legislation, therefore, attempts to enhance the effectiveness ofthe
civil law by making federal legislation more compatible with it. As
the Minister of Justice emphasized,
I want to make it absolutely clear that this bill is the reverse
of assimilation. For example, we have passed federal
bankruptcy and insolvency legislation in the past that
reflected common law principles only. One might argue that
that was assimilative, in that we did not acknowledge
principles such as surety and others on bankruptcy and
insolvency as expressed in the Civil Code and the civil law.
35
The Act also addresses the legal anomaly created by the fact that
at Confederation the federal Parliament assumed jurisdiction over
certain provisions of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. Despite
adopting a new Code in 1994, Qu6bec has been unable to repeal these
laws because they are in the federal sphere. One critic noted that:
31. Alai Bisson, Testimony to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs (June 14, 2000) (on file with author).
32. Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, First Session, Thirty-
seventh Parliament,49-50 Elizabeth II, 2001.
33. See the News Release: Re Bill C-50, released June 12, 1998.
34. Interpretation Act, No. 1, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, § 8.2 (Can.).
35. McLellan Testimony, supra note 29.
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These provisions were part of one Code and one whole
system. Since the demise of that Code, they have been
isolated from the system to which they belonged. They
express a law frozen in wording more than a century old, and
their relationship with the current civil law has become
imbued with conflict.
36
The Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, is only the
latest effort by the federal government to protect bijuralism. An
earlier initiative was meant to ensure that federal legislation emerges
from a truly bijural drafting process. In 1978, the Department of
Justice made a momentous decision to have two lawyers assigned to
each government bill, one anglophone common lawyer and one
francophone civilian lawyer. This system, called co-drafting, has
survived despite some experimentation with a bilingual single drafter
approach. As Lionel Levert, who has served as Chief Legislative
Counsel at the Department of Justice, has observed, the government
believes that:
[I]t is virtually impossible for any person to be fluent enough
in any language other than his or her mother tongue to be
completely comfortable in drafting, with all the necessary
nuances, a bill in that language . . . it is [also] almost
impossible for the drafter to be completely objective in his or
her preparation of the second language version.37
Co-drafting is meant to ensure that the four distinct audiences for
federal legislation, namely anglophone and francophone common-law
lawyers and civilian lawyers, are all included. Levert noted that:
The bilingual and bijural tools now available to drafters of
statutes and regulations and jurilinguists are the product of
work done by POLAJ-the Program for the Integration of
Both Official Languages in the Administration of Justice, the
objectives of which are essentially to improve access to
justice in both official languages by promoting, among other
things, the creation of tools for the people who draft
legislation in this country. This network involves most of the
organizations involved in the administration ofjustice in both
of Canada's official languages. It brings together the centres
for jurilinguistics, the associations of French-speaking
36. Andr6 Morel, Harmonizing Federal Legislation with the Civil Code of
Qudbec: Why? and Wherefore?, in Booklet 1 of The Harmonization of Federal
Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism 11 (Dep't of Justice,
Canada, 1999).
37. Lionel A. Levert, Bilingual Drafting in Canada, Address to the 10th
Commonwealth Law Conference (May 1993) (on file with author).
4592002]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
lawyers and their national organization, government
institutions and the universities active in training lawyers
either in the common law in French or in the civil law in
English.38
I have strayed from my judicial perspective to highlight the
innovations in legislative harmonization because that is the most
significant development in Canadian bijuralism today. Some have,
moreover, predicted that the federal government may in the future
have "a preoccupation with harmonizing federal law with aboriginal
law."39 That is a fascinating story but best left for a future lecture on
trijuralism.
V. PRECEDENT IN QUtBEC
I would like now to embark on a case study of Canadian
bijuralism in operation. My chosen topic is the role of precedent in
the decisions of Quebec courts.40 The definitional intertwining of the
common law with adherence to precedent is a legal truism. More
colourfully, Lord Justice Cooper, once Lord President of the Court of
Sessions in Scotland, wrote in the 1950 Harvard Law Review that in
adjudication civil-law judges silently ask themselves "What should
we do this time?" whereas their common-law counterparts ask aloud
"What did we do last time?"'" The true story, as is often the case, is
less formalistic than these absolute distinctions lead one to believe.
To set the stage for my discussion, I note that Quebec has three
levels of courts: the Court of Quebec (an inferior court with
provincially-appointed judges); the Quebec Superior Court (with
general jurisdiction); and the Court of Appeal of Quebec, the latter
two having federally appointed judges. These judges decide civil
cases arising under both federal and provincial law. The Supreme
Court of Canada, the highest court of appeal in both civil and criminal
cases, always has threejustices from Quebec, who generally write the
38. Lionel A. Levert, The Cohabitation of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in
Federal Legislation in Canada: Myth or Reality? (May 1999), reprinted in
Department of Justice Canada, Byuralism andHarmonization: Genesis, in Booklet
1 of The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province
of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism 8 (Second Publication, 2001).
39. Macdonald, Bijuralism in Canadian Law, supra note 25.
40. This section draws on Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, By Reason ofAuthority or
By Authority of Reason, 27 University of British Columbia Law Review 1 (1993).
See generally Albert Mayrand, L 'autoritg du prcddent au Quibec, 28 La revue
juridique Thrmis 773 (1994).
41. Thomas M. Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law-A Scot's View, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 468,471 (1950) (quoted in Wolfgang Oehler, Working with a Code:
Is There a Difference Between Civil-Law and Common-Law People?, 1997 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 711, 715 (1997).
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leading decisions in cases involving Quebec civil law. Unlike the
professionalized judicial system of many civil-law countries where
one trains to be ajudge, practising lawyers are appointed to be judges
in Quebec.
In this institutional context, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Canada once remarked that the decisions of the courts in
civil-law jurisprudence were determined by authority of reason rather
than by reason of authority. This is consistent with civilian legal
theory, exemplified by Planiol's treatise:
Judicial Interpretation is free in principle. Every tribunal may
adopt the solution which it considers the most just and the
best. It is bound neither by decisions which it may have
rendered previously in analogous cases nor by those of a
higher court.42
However, in 1932, the aforementioned Chief Justice Anglin's last
year on the bench, he also wrote: "In my opinion, the doctrine of
stare decisis must equally apply in the determination of any case
which comes before this court, whatever may be the province of its
origin. 4 3 This is the seemingly irreconcilable tension between the
civil law and the use of precedent that I wish briefly to explore.
Interestingly, the early posture of Quebec courts generally, and
the Quebec Court of Appeal in particular, was to ignore the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada in matters governed by the civil law.
The principle of stare decisis was expressly formulated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1909, when the Court stated that
previous decisions should not be disregarded other than in "very
exceptional cases."" Yet, even after this strong statement, the
Quebec Court of Appeal systematically contradicted certain Supreme
Court of Canada decisions for three decades. Moreover, the authority
of the Supreme Court in matters of civil law suffered an additional
setback because many 9urbec scholars and practitioners severely
criticized its judgments.
The Supreme Court did have an early predisposition to unifying
certain aspects of Canadian private law. In the words of France
Allard, the "judgments supported a unidirectional comparative
analysis of the law, from common law to civil law. ' 46 The case most
42. 1 Marcel Planiol, Trait6 l~lmentaire de Droit Civil, § 204, at 152 (La. St.
L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959).
43. Daoust v. Ferland, [1932] S.C.R. 343, 351 (Can.).
44. Stuart v. Bank of Montreal, [1909] 41 S.C.R. 535 (Can.).
45. See L'Heureux-Dub, supra note 40, at 11.
46. France Allard, The Supreme Court of Canada and Its Impact on the
Expression of Bijuralism, in Booklet 3 of The Harmonization of Federal
Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism
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frequently cited for this tendency is Canadian Pacific Railway v.
Robinson of 1887. 47 There, the issue was whether damages by way
of solatium doloris could be claimed in an action under Article 1056
of the Civil Code of Quebec, a provision which had English origins.
The Supreme Court of Canada answered in the negative. Justice
Taschereau wrote: "It cannot [be] intended by this legislation, that if
a man was killed in Upper Canada, no solatium should be granted.
. . but that if he was killed in Lower Canada such solatium [should]
be given. 4 8 Justice Ritchie expressed a similar concern: "I think it
would be much to be regretted if we were compelled to hold that
damages should be assessed by different rules in the different
provinces through which the same railroad [might] run."'
This attempt to unify was criticized as ousting the civil law
through a reasoning and interpretive process that was inspired by
common-law principles. Present-day Quebec Court of Appeal judge
Jean-Louis Baudouin, who recently presented the Tucker lecture at
the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, cogently criticized the late nineteenth
century Court for the Robinson decision:
[T]he solution may not be bad at all since it is extremely
difficult to evaluate the tears and suffering of a wife, of a
father, or of a child for the loss of a loved one. However, the
reasoning process is entirely wrong. [Just] because the
common-law courts have chosen to bar recovery for purely
moral damages.., the common-law interpretation [does not
have to be] given to Article 1056. In other words, when one
borrows a rule from another jurisdiction it does not
necessarily mean that one wants to borrow as well the foreign
interpretation of that rule.5"
By 1920, however, the "fear of common law's power to
assimilate civilian culture greatly contributed to the movement for the
defense of the integrity of civil law. One of the pillars of this
movement was Mignault, a justice of the Supreme Court."'" In the
5 (Second Publication, 2001), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/table.htm.
47. [1887] 14 S.C.R. 105 (Can.), rev'don other grounds, [1892] A.C. 481.
48. Id. at 124 (Taschereau, J.) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 111 (Ritchie, C.J.).
50. Jean-Louis Baudouin, The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian
Systems of Louisiana and Quebec, in The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine
in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions 19-20 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974).
51. Allard, supra note 46, at 9. See generally Jean-Gabriel Castel, Le Juge
Mignault Dgfenseur deL 'int~gritg du Droit Civil Qudbgcois, 53 Can. Bar Rev. 544
(1975).
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case of Desrosiers v. Canada,2 he applied a different approach in
arguing forcefully against the use of common-law precedents in civil-
law cases:
With respect, it seems to me that it is time to react against the
habit, in cases from the province of Qu6bec, of resorting to
English common law precedents, on the ground that the Civil
Code contains a rule which is in accordance with a rule of
English law. On many points . . . the Civil Code and the
common law do have similar rules. However, the civil law is
a complete system in itself and must be interpreted in
accordance with its own rules. If, whenever the legal
principles are the same, the courts can resort to English law
in order to interpret French civil law, the monuments of
French jurisprudence might equally be cited to throw light
upon the rules of English law. 3
This equanimity was a harbinger of a more positive era to come.
Professor Patrick Glenn of McGill University has commented that:
Since at least the middle of the century, it has become clear
that the Supreme Court has definitively renounced that idea
of national unification of the law and the idea that
comparative law must serve to establish new rules that are
exclusive and imperative. This change came about initially
through a new recognition of the sources of civil law, notably
Qu6bec and French doctrine, and by an acknowledgment of
the impossibility of systematically discounting an entire
corpus of rules of which the quality and coherence does not
suffer in any way from a comparison with the common law.54
In 1975, the Court overturned the holding in Robinson. In Pantel
v. Air Canada, Justice Pigeon wrote that "Article 1056 must... be
interpreted, not as reproducing a statute of English inspiration, but as
a new provision forming part of a codification in which some
fundamental principles are radically different from those of the
common law . . ... " Professor Glenn rightly emphasized the
52. [1920] 60 S.C.R. 105 (Can.).
53. Id. at 126.
54. H. Patrick Glenn, Le droit comparg et la Cour supreme du Canada, in
M61anges Louis-Philippe Pigeon, Ouvrages collectifs 211 (1989) (translation taken
from Louise Lavall6e, Biuralism in Supreme Court of Canada Judgments Since
the Enactment of the Civil Code of Quebec, in Booklet 3 of The Harmonization of
Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Qu6bec and Canadian
Bijuralism 2 (Second Publication, 2001), available at
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hfl/table.htm).
55. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 472, 478 (Can.). See also Augustus v. Gosset, [1996] 3
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important role of Justice Pigeon in making amends for the Supreme
Court's self-imposed early insularity from civil law:
This old tradition of comparative law is simply an attempt to
find a better solution, the discovery of which can never stop
the further search for an even better solution. In this search,
no source can be ruled out, as the Supreme Court did to a
certain extent in the first half-century of its existence. And
since sources cannot be excluded in creating a new law, they
cannot be excluded any more in the continuation of one's own
law. Sources must be judged on their merits. This was one
of the leitmotifs of Mr. Justice Pigeon, who constantly
showed in his work how the civil law and common law
traditions need each other, while respecting each other's
integrity.
5 6
In 1992, I added my own words to this long conversation:
"Quebec private law includes a wealth of rules of law drawn from
foreign sources ... The common law principles cannot simply be
applied to these rules, in my opinion, without first directly addressing
the question of whether those principles are even compatible with the
recipient law .... -"7 In another case, I noted in a unanimous
judgment that:
[T]he courts have a duty to ensure that insurance law
develops in a manner consistent with the rest of Quebec civil
law, of which it forms a part. Accordingly, while the
judgments of foreign jurisdictions, in particular Britain, the
United States and France, may be of interest when the law
there is based on similar principles, the fact remains that
Quebec civil law is rooted in concepts peculiar to it, and
while it may be necessary to refer to foreign law in some
cases, the courts should only adopt whatis consistent with the
general scheme of Quebec law.
58
With this less imperialist stance, the Supreme Court has greatly
enhanced the authority of its civil-law decisions among Quebec
judges, academics, and practitioners.59 Civil-law decisions are now
binding in practice, although in theory they remain only persuasive.
S.C.R. 268 (Can.).
56. Glenn, supra note 54, at 213.
57. Vid~otron Lt~e v. Industries Microlec Produits tlectroniques, Inc., [1992]
2 S.C.R. 1065 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting).
58. Caisse populaire des deux rives v. Socit6 mutuelle d'assurance contre
rincendie de la valle du richelieu, [1990] S.C.R. 995, 1004 (Can.).
59. See generally H. Patrick Glenn, La Cour suprdme du Canada et la
tradition du droit civil, 80 La Revue du Barreau Canadien 151 (2001).
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Another important factor in the attention given by Quebec courts to
precedent was pointed out by Judge Baudouin:
In Quebec and in Louisiana, the principle of the supremacy of
legislation over other sources of law seems to be accepted as
a premise. However, it would be futile to argue that this
principle carries the same impact as it does in France, unless
one forgets that both Quebec and Louisiana adopted...
common-law procedure, most of the common-law rules of
evidence, . . . common-law trial techniques, and, most
important of all, the common-law respect and attitude towards
the judiciary and the judicial function as a whole.
60
Justice Mignault himself had written in the 1925 Canadian Bar
Review about Quebec's legal tradition that:
[O]ur civil law being French, our commercial law partly
English and partly French, our procedure and mode of
conducting trials a mixture of the two, and our criminal law
entirely English, it is natural that, in so far as the authority of
decided cases is concerned, we should be nearer to the
English than to the French system.61
Proximity is a long way from uniformity, however, and the history of
the attitude of Quebec courts towards the civil-law decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada shows that, as in all fields of law, we
justices have to earn the respect of our colleagues. Justice Robert
Jackson of the United States Supreme Court wrote in 1953 that "[w]e
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible because
we are final."'62 In Quebec, the absence of theoretical justification for
strict adherence to our civil-law precedents serves as a subtle
reminder of the Supreme Court's responsibilities as guardian of the
Canadian bijural tradition.
VI. CONCLUSION: BIJURALISM AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LAW
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the benefits that accrue
to Canada from the herculean efforts by legislators, lawyers and
judges to accommodate the two legal systems. The Deputy Minister
of Justice recently stated that:
60. Baudouin, supra note 50, at 8.
61. Pierre-Basile Mignault, The Authority of Decided Cases, 3 Can. Bar Rev.
1, 11(1925).
62. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540,73 S. Ct. 397,427 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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[A] bijural culture can be a huge advantage for Canada, both
within our country and abroad, as a concrete demonstration of
respect and tolerance in both official languages, for all four
legal audiences . . . . [it] places Canadian jurists in a
privileged position in the world to encourage the progress of
law and the harmonious coexistence of legal traditions and,
therefore, to be active participants in shaping globalization. 3
Roderick Macdonald notes how:
[T]he exercise of negotiating legal bijuralism and legal
bilingualism in the federal legal order will make Canadian
law more attuned to emerging trends in the international
trading regime and will give Canada an important leadership
role in finding the vocabulary, concepts and institutions of
law needed to generate a new transnational lex mercatoria
that respects the genius of both the Romano-Germanic and
Anglo-American legal traditions.'
As the preamble to the Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act,
No. I states, one of the important fruits of bijuralism is that "the full
development of our two major legal traditions gives Canadians a
window on the world and facilitates exchanges with the vast majority
of other countries."65 I close with the hope that my observations have
presented a window on Canadian bijuralism and that Louisiana and
Quebec long continue to give North America a distinctly bijural legal
complexion.
63. Morris Rosenberg, Bijuralism and International Trade, Address at the
University of Ottawa Conference, Evolution of Legal Systems (Oct. 20, 2000),
reprinted in Department of Justice Canada, Byuralism and Harmonization:
Genesis, in Booklet 1 of The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil
Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism 33 (Second Publication,
2001).
64. Macdonald, Bijuralism in Canadian Law, supra note 25.
65. Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, 'c. 4,
Preamble (Can.).
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